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The New Rule for Patent Venue for
Corporate Defendants: Kansas was Never
Like This
"Click your heels together three times and say, 'There's no
place like home, there's no place like home.'"
I. Introduction
In 1989, Congress adopted the Judicial Improvements and
Access to Justice Act.2 The Act, among other things, amended
the general corporate venue provision, section 1391(c), s to allow
for venue in a jurisdiction when personal jurisdiction has been
obtained over the corporate defendant. Section 1391(c) now
states in pertinent part that "[flor purposes of venue under this
chapter, a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to
reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal
jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced . . . ." In VE
Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co.,' the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuits interpreted the phrase "for pur-
poses of venue under this chapter" as evidence of Congress' in-
tent to expand the residence test of the special venue statute for
patent infringement actions, section 1400(b).7 The effect of the
1. The Wizard of Oz (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939).
2. Act of Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, tit. X, § 1013(a), 102 Stat. 4642, 4669
(hereinafter the "Act").
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988).
4. Id. The former provision had stated that "[a] corporation may be sued in any
judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business,
and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue
purposes." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1982).
5. 917 F.2d 1574, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1614 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
6. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (hereinafter "CAFC") was estab-
lished by the Federal Court Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25
(1982). The CAFC has jurisdiction over various areas, but its primary focus is on hearing
patent appeals from the United States District Courts and the Patent and Trademark
Office. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), (4) (1988).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1988). Section 1400(b) provides that: "[a]ny civil action for
patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides,
1
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CAFC's opinion has been the effective repeal of section 1400(b),
except for actions involving non-corporate defendants.'
Prior to the VE Holding decision, the Supreme Court had
established conclusively that section 1400(b) was the sole and
exclusive venue provision in patent infringement actions.' The
case law and language of section 1400(b), however, have been the
subject of much criticism. 10 Several critics have advocated the
legislative repeal of section 1400(b). These critics have focused
almost exclusively on the perceived faults in the Court's inter-
pretation of the legislative history of section 1400(b) and the ex-
tensive case law which developed to interpret the language of
the statute."
These critics have overlooked a fundamental purpose of
venue statutes - protecting defendants from litigating in an
inconvenient or burdensome forum. Furthermore, they have ig-
nored the importance of the interaction between procedural re-
quirements and the substantive aspects of the law to which the
requirements apply. Recent developments in patent law, for ex-
ample, have created an environment that is overly advantageous
to plaintiffs, thereby necessitating a special patent venue
provision. 2
Part II of this Comment discusses the purposes of venue
statutes in general, traces the statutory and judicial history of
section 1400(b), and describes the state of patent venue before
the CAFC's decision in VE Holding. Part III discusses the VE
Holding decision. Previous criticisms of section 1400(b) are sum-
marized in Part IV. Part V addresses the CAFC's opinion in VE
Holding and the criticisms of section 1400(b), and concludes
that a judicial or legislative repeal of the statute is an inappro-
priate solution to the problems associated with it. This Com-
ment concludes that Congress must act to overturn the VE
or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and estab-
lished place of business." Id.
8. The Supreme Court denied the defendant's writ of certiorari. 111 S. Ct. 1315
(1991). One court has extended the holding to apply to partnerships. See Injection Re-
search Specialists v. Polaris Indus., 759 F. Supp. 1511, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1800 (1991).
9. See infra notes 32-75 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 138-162 and accompanying text.
11. Id.
12. See infra notes 193-209 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 11:667
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol11/iss3/9
PATENT VENUE
Holding decision through a legislative amendment to section
1400(b) that would eliminate its ambiguous and restrictive ele-
ments and still protect the interests of corporate defendants.
II. The History of Patent Venue
A. Venue Generally
Venue is a statutory device designed to limit a plaintiff's
choice of forum.18 Generally, federal venue provisions provide
for venue in a jurisdiction in which either the defendant resides
or the subject claim arose.14 Venue has been recognized as a
mechanism to provide litigants with a convenient forum, 15 to
protect defendants from litigating in inconvenient forums,1 e and
to prohibit plaintiffs from unrestrained forum shopping. 17 In de-
termining whether venue is proper, courts have considered the
number of contacts a party has with the jurisdiction 8 and the
significance of those contacts.'
The first explicit federal venue requirements were imposed
by statute in 1887.20 The statute restricted venue to the district
in which the defendant was an inhabitant.2 Before the statute's
adoption, an action could be brought in any district in which the
defendant was an inhabitant or could be found.22
13. See Penrod Drilling Co. v. Johnson, 414 F.2d 1217, 1221-22 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970).
14. See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3804, at 18
(1976).
15. See Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167-68 (1939).
16. See Whittier v. Emmet, 281 F.2d 24, 30 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 935
(1960).
17. See Union Pac. R.R. v. Woodahl, 308 F. Supp. 1002, 1008 (D. Mont. 1970).
18. See Pennwalt Corp. v. Horton Co., 582 F. Supp. 438, 223 U.S.P.Q. 1113 (E.D.
Pa. 1984).
19. See Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 371 F. Supp. 247, 251
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
20. Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552, as corrected by the Act of August 13,
1888, ch. 866, 25 Stat. 433.
21. Id. at 552, 25 Stat. at 434.
22. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137 18 Stat. (Part 3), 470, which was founded on sec-
tion 11 of the Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 78-79. For an analysis of the
venue provisions of the Act of 1789, see Warren, New Light on the History of the Fed-
eral Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HAv. L. REv. 49, 80-81 (1923). Statutory venue provisions
were the product of common law concepts of venue. See Blume, Place of Trial of Cases,
48 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1949).
1991]
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B. The Statutory History of Patent Venue23
The first patent venue statute was enacted in 1897.24 Before
its adoption, a split in authority had developed among the fed-
eral courts. Some courts adopted the venue provisions of the
1887 general venue statute, 5 while other courts followed the
provisions of the 1789 statute.2" Most interpreters of the 1897
patent venue statute agree that it was enacted to resolve the
split among the courts.2" Interpreters have debated whether
Congress intended to expand or restrict the scope of patent
venue in relation to the general venue provision.2 8 The provi-
sions of the 1897 statute were reenacted in the Act of 1911.29
The Act of 1948"0 revised and recodified the patent venue stat-
ute into its present format.31
23. See generally Wydick, Venue in Actions for Patent Infringement, 25 STAN. L.
REv. 551 (1973); Waldrop, The Patent Venue Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) Should Not
Be Repealed, 4 A.P.L.A. Q. J. 32 (1976); Comment, A New Look at Venue in Patent
Infringement Suits, 21 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 610 (1953); Comment, Venue in Patent In-
fringement Suits in the Federal Courts, 47 Nw. UL. REv. 699 (1952); Note, Corporate
Venue in Patent Infringement Cases, 40 DFPAUL L. REv. 207 (1990).
24. Act of March 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695, 695-96. The statute provided that:
[I]n suits brought for the infringement of letters patent the circuit courts of the
United States shall have jurisdiction... in the district of which the defendant is
an inhabitant, or any other district in which the defendant, whether a person,
partnership, or corporation, shall have committed acts of infringement and have a
regular and established place of business.
Id.
25. Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552, 552-53 (venue proper in a forum in
which the defendant was an inhabitant); see, e.g., National Typewriter Co. v. Pope Mfg.
Co., 56 F. 849 (C.C.D. Mass. 1893); Gormully & Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Pope Mfg. Co., 34 F.
818 (C.C. Ill. 1888) (venue governed by provisions of the Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373,
24 Stat. 552, which allowed for venue only in a forum in which the defendant was an
inhabitant).
26. Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78. See, e.g., In re Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653 (1893)
(dicta indicating that venue provisions were governed by the venue provisions of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78, which allowed venue in any district in
which the defendant was an inhabitant or could be found).
27. See Wydick, supra note 23, at 554; Waldrop, supra note 23, at 37.
28. See infra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
29. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 48, 36 Stat. 1100.
30. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 936.
31. Id. at § 1400(b). See supra note 7.
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C. The Sole and Exclusive Venue Provision
1. Stonite Products
In Stonite Products v. Melvin Lloyd Co.,3 2 the Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether the patent venue statute, section 48
of the Judicial Code, was the sole provision governing venue in
patent infringement actions, or whether the general venue stat-
ute, section 52, augmented the patent venue statute."3 Stonite
Products Company, an inhabitant of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania was sued for patent infringement in the Western
District of Pennsylvania. The district court granted Stonite's
motion to dismiss the action for improper venue because Stonite
did not have a regular and established place of business in the
Western District of Pennsylvania. 4 The Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit reversed"3 and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.36
Justice Murphy, writing for a unanimous Court, held that
section 48 was the exclusive patent venue provision, and there-
fore was not supplemented by section 52.11 Justice Murphy
found that the patent venue statute was restrictive and that
Congress' intent was not to have the patent venue statute "dove-
32. 315 U.S. 561, 52 U.S.P.Q. 507 (1942).
33. Id. at 561-62. 52 U.S.P.Q. 507. Section 48 stated in part:
In suits brought for the infringement of letters patent the district courts of the
United States shall have jurisdiction, in law or in equity, in the district of which
the defendant is an inhabitant, or in any district in which the defendant, whether
a person, partnership, or corporation, shall have committed acts of infringement
and have a regular and established place of business.
28 U.S.C. § 109 (1911) (recodified at 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1988)). Section 52 stated in
part:
When a State contains more than one district, every suit not of a local nature, in
the district court thereof, against a single defendant, inhabitant of such State,
must be brought in the district where he resides; but if there are two or more
defendants, residing in different districts of the State, it may be brought in either
district, and a duplicate writ may be issued against the defendants ....
28 U.S.C. § 113 (1911) (recodified at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988)).
34. Melvin Lloyd Co. v. Stonite Prod., 36 F. Supp. 29, 47 U.S.P.Q. 339 (W.D. Pa.
1940), rev'd, 119 F.2d 883, 49 U.S.P.Q. 476 (3d Cir. 1941), rev'd, 315 U.S. 561, 52
U.S.P.Q. 507 (1942).
35. Melvin Lloyd Co. v. Stonite Prod., 119 F.2d 883, 49 U.S.P.Q. 476 (3d Cir. 1941),
rev'd, 315 U.S. 561, 52 U.S.P.Q. 507 (1942).
36. 314 U.S. 594 (1941), rev'd, 315 U.S. 561, 52 U.S.P.Q. 507 (1942).
37. Stonite, 315 U.S. at 563, 52 U.S.P.Q. at 508.
1991]
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tail with the general provisions relating to the venue of civil
suits, but rather that it alone should control venue in patent in-
fringement proceedings.
2. Fourco
Fourco Glass Company, a West Virginia corporation, was
sued for patent infringement in the Southern District of New
York. 9 The district court granted Fourco's motion to dismiss for
improper venue, holding that Fourco, though having a regular
and established place of business, did not commit an act of in-
fringement within the forum.40 The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that Fourco "re-
sided" within the forum and, therefore, met the first prong of
the patent venue statute because it was "doing business" within
the forum.4 1 The court acknowledged that the patent venue stat-
ute was the exclusive venue provision for patent infringement
actions, but reasoned that the definition of "residence" in sec-
tion 1391(c) must be incorporated within the patent venue
statute. 2
38. Id. at 566, 52 U.S.P.Q. at 509.
39. Transmirra Prods. v. Fourco Glass Co., 133 F. Supp. 531, 106 U.S.P.Q. 305
(S.D.N.Y. 1955), rev'd, 233 F.2d 885, 109 U.S.P.Q. 325 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd, 353 U.S. 222,
113 U.S.P.Q. 234 (1957).
40. Fourco, 133 F. Supp. at 533, 106 U.S.P.Q. at 306-07.
41. Fourco, 233 F.2d at 886, 109 U.S.P.Q. at 325. The Judicial Code of 1948 enacted
a general corporate venue statute which stated: "A corporation may be sued in any judi-
cial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business,
and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue
purposes." Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1391(c), 62 Stat. 869, 935 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1391(c)). The provisions of the patent venue statute were amended to match the
current provision. See supra notes 30-31.
42. Fourco, 233 F.2d at 886, 109 U.S.P.Q. at 325-26. The court considered three
reasons for allowing the provisions of section 1391(c) to expand the definition of "resi-
dence" in section 1400(b). First, such an interpretation was consistent with the then
current trend of expanding the jurisdiction over corporations beyond the "fiction" of a
corporation residing only in the state of its incorporation. Id. at 887, 109 U.S.P.Q. at 326-
27. Second, the court reasoned that it was "unreasonable" to extend "unexpressed excep-
tions" to limit the "beneficial principle" of expanding jurisdiction over corporations, not-
ing it would be "odd drafting" to provide a "general and unlimited defining statute" with
several specific exceptions, one of which was section 1400(b). Id. at 888, 109 U.S.P.Q. at
327. Finally, the court discounted the argument that the integration of the two sections
would render section 1400(b) superfluous. The court noted that section 1400(b) would
still pertain to non-corporate defendants. Id.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol11/iss3/9
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari 4 to resolve a conflict
among the circuits. Some circuits had held that the amendments
to the general venue statute, section 1391(c), should be read into
the provisions of section 1400(b). This was the holding of the
Fourco court.' Other circuits, however, followed Stonite in
holding that section 1400(b) was the exclusive venue statute for
patent infringement actions." The Supreme Court reversed and
remanded for the court of appeals to consider the district court's
ruling that there had been no demonstration of an act of in-
fringement within the forum."
Justice Whittaker stated in the majority opinion that sec-
tion 1400(b) was the "sole and exclusive provision controlling
venue in patent infringement actions, and that it [was] not...
supplemented by ... § 1391(c).' 7 The Court reiterated its hold-
ing in Stonite that the patent venue statute was the exclusive
venue provision for patent infringement actions.48 It then con-
sidered whether there had been a "substantive change" in the
patent venue statute since the Stonite decision.' The Court ex-
amined the alterations to the statutory language and the legisla-
tive history of the 1948 Act and determined that no substantive
changes had been made to the previous patent venue statute.50
43. 352 U.S. 820 (1956).
44. Transmirra Prod. v. Fourco Glass Co., 233 F.2d 885, 109 U.S.P.Q. 325 (2d Cir.
1956), rev'd, 353 U.S. 222, 113 U.S.P.Q. 234 (1957). The Second Circuit in Fourco and
the Fifth Circuit in Guiberson Corp. v. Garrett Oil Tools, Inc., 205 F.2d 660, 98 U.S.P.Q.
165 (5th Cir. 1953) and Dalton v. Shakespeare Co., 196 F.2d 469, 93 U.S.P.Q. 134 (5th
Cir. 1952) held that section 1400(b) was supplemented by section 1391(c).
45. The Third, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits held in Ackerman v. Hook, 183 F.2d 11,
86 U.S.P.Q. 1 (3d Cir. 1950), C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co. v. Barnes, 194 F.2d 410, 92
U.S.P.Q. 395 (7th Cir. 1952) and Ruth v. Eagle-Picher Co., 225 F.2d 572, 106 U.S.P.Q.
251 (10th Cir. 1955), respectively, that section 1400(b) was the exclusive venue provision
for patent infringement actions.
46. Fourco, 353 U.S. at 229, 113 U.S.P.Q. at 237.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 225, 113 U.S.P.Q. at 235.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 227-28,' 113 U.S.P.Q. at 236. The Court relied heavily on the statements of
several of the legislation's sponsors who stated "no changes of law or policy will be pre-
sumed from changes of language in revision unless an intent to make such changes is
clearly expressed", id. at 227 n. 8, 113 U.S.P.Q. at 236 n. 8, and on statutory construction
which did not allow for an inference of congressional intent to alter a statute's effect
when the statute, has been revised and consolidated, "unless such intention is clearly
expressed." Id. at 227, 113 U.S.P.Q. at 236. The Court discounted Transmirra's argu-
ment that the language of § 1391(c) was clear and unambiguous, and that its provisions
1991]
7
PACE LAW REVIEW
Justice Harlan, in a lone dissent, objected to the Court's undue
reliance on the legislative history of the 1948 Act and supported
the reasoning of the court of appeals.51
3. Schnell
In Schnell v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, 2 the Court considered
whether a manufacturer of an allegedly infringing machine had
waived its objection to venue by willingly defending one of its
customers.53 Allbright-Nell Company was an Illinois corporation
and the manufacturer of a machine for cutting sausage meat
which allegedly infringed Schnell's patent.5 4 Allbright Nell sold
some of the machines to Peter Eckrich & Sons whose principal
place of business was in Fort Wayne, Indiana.5 5 Schnell sued
Eckrich in Indiana for patent infringement. 6 Allbright-Nell re-
tained counsel to defend Eckrich pursuant to its contract of sale.
Under the contract, Allbright-Nell agreed to indemnify Eckrich
in any infringement action brought against Eckrich arising out
of its use of the sausage cutting machine. 7 Schnell amended its
complaint to add Allbright-Nell as an additional defendant.58
Allbright-Nell sought to dismiss for improper venue because it
neither resided in nor had a regular and established place of
business within Indiana.59 Schnell conceded that venue was im-
proper against Allbright-Nell under section 1400(b), but argued
that it should be deemed to have entered a general appearance
by defending Eckrich and had thus waived objection to venue.60
The Court held that venue was improper and reaffirmed its pre-
vious holdings in Stonite and Fourco.61
should be read with those of § 1400(b), noting that both venue provisions considered in
Stonite were equally clear and unambiguous. Id. at 228, 113 U.S.P.Q. at 237.
51. Id. at 229, 113 U.S.P.Q. at 237.
52. 365 U.S. 260, 128 U.S.P.Q. 305 (1961).
53. Id. at 260, 128 U.S.P.Q. at 305.
54. Id. at 260-61, 128 U.S.P.Q. at 305.
55. Id. at 261, 128 U.S.P.Q. at 305.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id., 128 U.S.P.Q. at 306.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 261-62, 128 U.S.P.Q. at 306.
61. Id. The Court also considered whether the activities of Allbright-Nell before and
after it was joined as a party constituted waiver of an objection to venue, and concluded
[Vol. 11:667
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4. Brunette Machine
In Brunette Machine Works v. Kockum -Industries,62
Kockum Industries, an Alabama corporation doing business in
Oregon, sued Brunette Machine Works, a Canadian corporation.
The suit was brought in Oregon for infringement of Kockum's
patent on a machine that removed bark from logs." Brunette
moved for dismissal for improper venue, claiming that section
1400(b) was the exclusive venue provision for patent infringe-
ment actions." The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
versed the district court's dismissal of the action because Bru-
nette did not "reside" in Oregon and did not have a regular and
established place of business there.65 The court of appeals held66
and the Supreme Court affirmed, 7 that section 1391(d) applies
"to all others" and therefore Brunette as an alien defendant was
subject to suit in any district.6 8
Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, reaffirmed
the decisions in Stonite and Fourco.6 9 The Court distinguished
the two decisions, however, by explaining that Congress had en-
acted section 1391(d) as a "principle of broad and overriding ap-
plication, and not merely as an adjustment to the general venue
statute" as occurred in Stonite and Fourco.0
they did not. Id. at 264, 128 U.S.P.Q. 307. The Court stated that "[t]he requirement of
venue is specific and unambiguous; it is not one of those vague principles which, in the
interest of some overriding policy, is to be given a 'liberal' construction" (citing Olberd-
ing v. Illinois Central R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 340 (1953)). Id.
62. 406 U.S. 706, 174 U.S.P.Q. 1 (1972).
63. Id. at 707, 174 U.S.P.Q. at 1.
64. Id.
65. Kockum Indus. v. Brunette Machine Works, 442. F.2d 420, 169 U.S.P.Q. 772
(9th Cir. 1971), afl'd, 406 U.S. 706, 174 U.S.P.Q. 1 (1972). (The district court opinion is
unpublished.)
66. Id.
67. Brunette Machine Works v. Kockum Indus., 406 U.S. 706, 174 U.S.P.Q. 1 (1972).
68. Id. at 707, 174 U.S.P.Q. at 1.
69. Id. at 713, 174 U.S.P.Q. at 4.
70. Id. at 714, 174 U.S.P.Q. at 4. The Court relied largely on its opinion in In re
Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653 (1893), which stated that the general venue statutes were inappli-
cable to suits against alien defendants. Brunette, 406 U.S. at 709-11, 174 U.S.P.Q. at 2-3.
The Court noted that Congress had not acted to overturn the reasoning in Hohorst. In
Hohorst, the Court had concluded that holding the venue statutes applicable to actions
against alien defendants would "oust the federal courts of jurisdiction." Id. at 709, 174
U.S.P.Q. at 2.
1991]
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D. Patent Venue Prior to VE Holding
Venue for a corporate defendant in a patent infringement
action is determined by either (1) where the defendant resides,
or (2) where it has a regular and established place of business
and has committed an act of infringement.71
1. Resides
Prior to the CAFC's opinion in VE Holding Corp. v. John-
son Gas Appliance Co., 72 it had been a virtual maxim of patent
law that, for venue purposes, a corporate defendant resides only
in the state of its incorporation. 7 The CAFC's decision, how-
ever, swept away fifty years of judicial precedent by holding that
section 1400(b) was no longer the sole and exclusive patent
venue provision and that the term "resides" in section 1400(b)
was to be interpreted in conjunction with the definition of "re-
side" as found in section 1391(c). 7 ' Now, venue in patent in-
fringement actions will be found proper in any district in which
a court has personal jurisdiction over the corporate defendant.75
71. 35 U.S.C. 271(a) (1988). Both provisions of the second prong of section 1400(b)
must be met. See Holab Indus., Inc. v. Wyche, 290 F.2d 852, 129 U.S.P.Q. 242 (4th Cir.
1961).
72. 917 F.2d 1574, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1614 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
73. Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products, 353 U.S. 222, 113 U.S.P.Q. 234 (1957).
The decision was founded primarily on the exclusive nature of the patent venue statute.
See supra notes 39-51 and accompanying text. The definition has gone almost unques-
tioned by the judiciary. See, e.g., Picker Int'l Inc. v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 661 F. Supp.
347, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1964 (N.D. Ohio 1987); Byrnes v. Jetnet Corp., 231 U.S.P.Q. 670 (D.
Neb. 1986); B.W.B. Controls, Inc. v. C.S.E. Automation Eng'g & Serve., 587 F. Supp.
1027, 224 U.S.P.Q. 444 (W.D. La. 1984); Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., 561 F. Supp 787
(D. N.J. 1983); Brunswick Corp. v. Suzuki Motor Co., 575 F. Supp. 1412, 220 U.S.P.Q.
822 (E.D. Wis. 1983); Air Factors, Inc. v. Tempmaster Corp., 363 F. Supp. 93, 180
U.S.P.Q. 29 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Faberge, Inc. v. Schick Elec., Inc., 312 F. Supp. 559, 165
U.S.P.Q. 592 (D. Del. 1970); Aileen Mills Co. v. Ojay Mills, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 131, 128
U.S.P.Q. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
In In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733, 16 U.S.P.Q. 784 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 851 (1985), its only opinion addressing patent venue prior to VE Holding, the
CAFC also adopted the definition of "resides" established by Fourco. Cordis, 769 F.2d at
735-36.
74. VE Holding, 917 F.2d at 1575, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1614-15.
75. A defendant must have minimum contacts with the forum so that maintaining
an action in the forum will not deprive him of his due process rights. See Asahi Metal
Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980);
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol11/iss3/9
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2. Regular and Established Place of Business and Act of
Infringement
a. Regular and Established Place of Business
Two distinct lines of reasoning developed to determine
when a corporate defendant maintained a "regular and estab-
lished place of business" within the forum." The first estab-
lished that the defendant must have a fixed, physical facility
under its substantial control within the forum." Under the
other, more liberal approach, the appropriate test is whether the
defendant has a "permanent and continuous presence" within
the forum.78
In In re Cordis Corp.,79 on petition for a writ of mandamus,
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)
76. For a thorough discussion of earlier courts' approaches, see Annotation, What
Constitutes "Regular and Established Place of Business" Within Meaning of 28
U.S.C.S. § 1400(b). Fixing Venue in Actions for Patent Infringement, 12 A.L.R. FED.
502 (1972).
77. An often cited opinion exemplifying this line of reasoning is Mastantuono v.
Jacobsen Mfg Co., 184 F. Supp. 178, 126 U.S.P.Q. 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). The court stated
that a "regular and established place of business" was determined by the following
requirements:
Mere "doing business" in a district is not of itself sufficient to confer venue in
patent suits. Something more is required. It must appear that a defendant is regu-
larly engaged in carrying on a substantial part of its ordinary business on a perma-
nent basis in a physical location within the district over which it exercises some
measure of control.
Id. at 180, 126 U.S.P.Q. at 40.
The Seventh Circuit has consistently adopted this viewpoint. See, e.g., Dual Mfg &
Eng'g, Inc. v. Burris Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 1382, 190 U.S.P.Q. 449 (7th Cir. 1976); Univer-
sity of Illinois Found. v. Channel Master Corp., 382 F.2d 514, 155 U.S.P.Q. 117 (7th Cir.
1967); Grantham v. Challenge-Cook Bros., Inc., 420 F.2d 1182, 164 U.S.P.Q. 259 (7th Cir.
1969); Knapp-Monarch Co. v. Casco Prod. Corp., 342 F.2d 622, 145 U.S.P.Q. 1 (7th Cir.
1965).
78. See In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733, 737 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 851
(1985); see, e.g., Instrumentation Specialties Co. v. Water Assocs., Inc., 196 U.S.P.Q. 684,
(N.D. I1 1977); CPG Prod. Corp. v. Mego Corp., 214. U.S.P.Q. 129 (S.D. Ohio 1980);
Brunswick Corp. v. Suzuki Motor Co., 575 F. Supp. 1412, 220 U.S.P.Q. 822 (E.D. Wis.
1983); Shelter-Lite, Inc. v. Reeves Bros., Inc., 356 F. Supp. 189, 177 U.S.P.Q. 683 (N.D.
Ohio 1973).
79. Cordis 769 F.2d at 733. Cordis, a Florida corporation with its principal place of
business in Miami, Florida, was sued by Medtronic, a Minnesota corporation, for alleg-
edly infringing Medtronic's four patents on pace makers. Id. at 734. The district court
denied Cordis' motion to dismiss for improper venue under § 1400(b), in support of
which Cordis had contended that a finding of a regular and established place of business
required a "fixed, physical location." Id. at 734-35. The district court considered that
11
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the CAFC had an opportunity to address the issue of what con-
stitutes a "regular and established place of business."80 The
CAFC concluded that the determination of "whether a corporate
defendant has a regular and established place of business in a
district ... is whether the corporate defendant does its business
in that district through a permanent and continuous presence
there and not . . . whether it has a fixed physical presence
. . "81 In reaching its conclusion, however, the CAFC limited
the application of its holding by noting that mandamus is "re-
served for the most serious and critical ills, and if a rational and
substantial legal argument can be made in support of the rule in
question, the case is not appropriate for mandamus, even though
on normal appeal, a court might find reversible error. "82
In Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing v. Johnson & John-
son Products,3 the court adopted the "permanent and continu-
ous presence" approach employed in Cordis.84 The court upheld
venue in Minnesota due to the defendant's "substantial" pres-
ence in the forum, despite the absence of a fixed location. 5 In
contrast, the court in Herbert v. Diagnostic Products," adopted
the more conservative approach, which it found reflected an
"older line of authority and apparently the majority rule. '87
Cordis employed two fulltime sales representatives within Minnesota, who maintained
offices within their homes for which they took income tax deductions and which were
used to store Cordis products valued between $30,000 and $60,000. Id. Cordis was listed
in the local telephone directory and employed a secretarial service to answer telephone
calls, provide typing services to the two sales representatives, and receive shipments of
Cordis sales literature. Id.
80. Id. at 736-37.
81. Id. at 737.
82. Id.
83. 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1992 (D. Minn. 1986).
84. Id. at 1994-95. The court acknowledged that the Cordis holding had limited ap-
plication because of the "peculiar procedural posture" of Cordis, but noted that the
holding nevertheless reflected a majority trend in patent venue cases. Id. at 1994.
85. Id. at 1996. Johnson & Johnson, a New Jersey corporation, neither owned nor
leased office space or property within Minnesota. It had no telephone listings or central
location for the receipt of mail. Id. It operated through three divisions with aggregate
sales over 43 million dollars in Minnesota from 1981 to 1985. Its 1985 sales volume ex-
ceeded ten million dollars. Johnson & Johnson also used Minnesota as the base for its
activities in surrounding states. Id. at 1995-96.
86. 231 U.S.P.Q. 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
87. Id. at 912. The court distinguished Cordis on the basis of the procedural nature
of the appeal and the CAFC's emphasis on the particular facts of the case. Id. See also
Omi Int'l Corp. v. MacDermid, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1012, 231 U.S.P.Q. 232 (M.D.N.C.
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b. Act of Infringement
The analysis employed by the courts concerning what con-
stitutes an "act of infringement" is equally uncertain.88 As with
the first prong of the requirement for venue, two viewpoints
have developed interpreting when an act of infringement has oc-
curred in the forum. The more restrictive viewpoint evolved
from the Supreme Court's decision in W.S. Tyler Co. v. Ludlow-
Saylor Wire Co."" The contrary approach developed from the
reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in
Union Asbestos & Rubber Co. v. Evans Products.9
In Tyler, the Court determined that the sale that was the
subject of the infringement action must be consummated in the
district in which the suit was brought and that the mere solicita-
tion of sales orders in that district did not constitute an act of
infringement.91 The Court's decision spawned a line of reasoning
commonly referred to as the "consummated sale doctrine" which
determined the concept of "sale" in relation to the term in com-
mercial law.9 2 In Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc.,9s the court de-
termined that venue was proper in the forum in which the con-
tract was made as determined through a contract analysis."" The
courts in both Medical Designs v. Orthopedic Technology5 and
Picker International v. Varian Associates" upheld the defend-
ants' contention that the term "sale" should be interpreted as
defined in the Uniform Commercial Code.9 7
1986); Schoofs v. Union Carbide Corp., 228 U.S.P.Q. 540 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (adopting the
conservative approach). Contra London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1148
(N.D. Ill. 1987); MAGICorp. v. Kinetic Presentations, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 334 (D.N.J.
1989) (following the reasoning of Cordis).
88. Infringement occurs when the alleged infringer without authority makes, uses, or
sells the patented invention. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1988). A lesser showing is necessary,
however, to establish venue than is required to prove infringement. See Kaz Mfg. Co. v.
Chesebrough-Ponds, Inc., 317 F.2d 679, 681, 137 U.S.P.Q. 588, 589 (2d Cir. 1963).
89. 236 U.S. 723 (1915).
90. 328 F.2d 949, 140 U.S.P.Q. 634 (7th Cir. 1964).
91. Tyler, 236 U.S. at 725.
92. In re Amoxicillin Patent and Antitrust Litigation, 220 U.S.P.Q. 379 (D.D.C.
1982); Self v. Fisher Controls, Co., 566 F.2d 62, 197 U.S.P.Q. 337 (9th Cir. 1977).
93. 226 U.S.P.Q. 971 (D. Md. 1985).
94. Id. at 973.
95. 684 F. Supp. 445 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
96. 661 F. Supp. 347, (N.D. Ohio 1987), affd," 869 F.2d 578 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
97. Medical Designs, 684 F. Supp. at 448; Picker Int'l, 661 F. Supp. at 350.
1991]
13
PACE LAW REVIEW
In Union Asbestos, the seventh circuit rejected the restric-
tive interpretation established by Tyler, finding that it was
based on dicta.98 It concluded that "the technicalities of sales
law should not control whether defendant's degree of conduct
within the district was sufficient to constitute 'acts of infringe-
ment' for venue purposes."99 The court held that the demonstra-
tions of the allegedly infringing device, coupled with the "sys-
tematic and continuous solicitation of orders within the
district," were sufficient to establish venue.100
III. VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co.
A. Background
The case of VE Holding arose from an appeal of a district
court decision granting a motion by the co-defendant, Johnson
Gas Appliance Company (Johnson Gas), to dismiss for improper
venue. 10 1 VE Holding Corporation (VE Holding) had filed an ac-
tion in the district court for the Northern District of California
against California Pellet Mill Company and Johnson Gas for al-
leged direct and contributory infringement of its patents. 02
Johnson Gas moved to dismiss for improper venue because, as
an Iowa corporation, it did not "reside" in California. 03 VE
98. 328 F.2d 949, 951 (7th Cir. 1964). According to the court, the Supreme Court
had already determined that venue was improper because of the failure to meet the "reg-
ular and established place of business" provision, and therefore the additional commen-
tary on acts of infringement was dicta. Id.
99. Id. at 952.
100. Id.
101. VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co, No. C89-3856SCENE, slip op.
at 1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 1990). The case was actually the consolidation of two separate
actions brought by VE Holding against Johnson Gas. VE Holding brought its initial ac-
tion on January 24, 1989. The district court dismissed the action against Johnson Gas for
improper venue on May 19, 1990. VE Holding subsequently refiled the same action
against Johnson Gas in the same court on October 26, 1989. The two actions were consol-
idated on November 3, 1989. VE Holding's refiling was prompted by a technicality in-
volving the effective date of the Act on February 27, 1989. As the date of the original
complaint preceded the effective date of the Act, the court's initial decision would not
allow for an appeal regarding the applicability of the amendments to section 1391(c).
The district court entered a final judgment on February 9, 1990. Id. at 1-2.
102. Id. VE Holding holds three U.S. patents, numbers 4,667,418, 4,704,804 and
4,731,938, for the treatment and temperature conditioning of various material in an ana-
erobic environment. Id. (Court of Appeals indicated the incorrect patent numbers).
103. Id.
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Holding responded that the new broad definition of "reside"
found in section 1391(c), allowing for venue when personal juris-
diction could be obtained over the defendant, should expand the
definition of "reside" in section 1400(b). 0 VE Holding predi-
cated its argument on the phrase "[flor purposes of venue under
this chapter" as contained in the amended section 1391(c). 10 5 It
also asserted that the statute's plain language indicated congres-
sional intent to expand the scope of "reside" in section 1391(c)
to cover all venue provisions contained in the chapter, including
1400(b).10 1 Several district courts had already issued conflicting
decisions interpreting the effect of the amendment to section
1391(c) on section 1400(b). 07
B. The District Court Opinion
In granting the motion to dismiss, the court rejected VE
Holding's contention that the new language of section 1391(c)
should be interpreted to expand its scope to that of section
1400(b).108 The court recognized that a "literal interpretation [of
section 1391(c)] against a fresh backdrop would demand that its
definition of 'reside' be applied to section 1400(b)," but noted
that it was "not free to interpret sections 1391(c) and 1400(b)
without considering [the] binding precedent" established by
Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods.
104. Id. slip op. at 3. VE Holding also contended that Johnson Gas maintained a
regular and established place of business in California. VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas
Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1576, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1614, 1615. The court, however, re-
jected VE Holding's argument in its May 19 opinion. In the subsequent action, VE Hold-
ing focused on the "residence" argument to sustain venue. VE Holding, slip op. at 2. The
district court .obtained personal jurisdiction over Johnson Gas through Johnson Gas' fail-
ure to join motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in its motions to dismiss
for improper venue pursuant to Rules 12(g) and 12(h)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Doelcher Prod. v. Hydrofoil Int'l, 735 F. Supp. 666, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d
1067 (D. Md. 1989) (holding amendment to Section 1391(c) did not supplement provi-
sions of Section 1400(b)); Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. Amerace Corp., 729 F. Supp. 1219, 14
U.S.P.Q.2d 1223 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding similar to Doelcher); Century Wrecker Corp. v.
Vulcan Equip. Co., 733 F. Supp. 1170, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1715 (E.D. Tenn. 1989) (holding
similar to VE Holding); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 734 F. Supp. 911, 14
U.S.P.Q.2d 1909 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (holding similar to VE Holding); Oakley Inc. v. Smith
Sports Optics Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1472 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (holding similar to VE Holding).
108. Id. slip op. at 2-3.
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Fourco unequivocally established section 1400(b) as the sole
and exclusive patent venue statute. 109 The district court in VE
Holding acknowledged that the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Fourco relied on the "history and purpose" of section 1400(b)
and not on its interpretation of the language of section
1391(c). ° The court noted that Congress may supercede a Su-
preme Court interpretation by amending the subject statute.
However, rules of statutory construction require courts to pre-
sume that in the absence of an express statement to the con-
trary, a legislature's intent is not to negate a long-standing pre-
cedent."' The court stated that "unless it is obvious that
Congress intended to overturn the Fourco Court's determination
of section 1400(b)'s purpose ... too much weight [should not be
given] to a change in the language of section 1391(c) when deter-
mining the scope of section 1400(b)." ls
The court found that the legislative history of section
1391(c) "manifests a concern wholly unrelated to altering the
historical exclusivity of section 1400(b).11 13 Rather, it demon-
strated that Congress amended section 1391(c) to allow for
venue in any district in a multidistrict state. 11' The court con-
cluded that there was insufficient evidence of Congress' intent to
alter the "historical exclusivity" of section 1400(b). 1 Addition-
ally, the court stated that the interpretation advanced by VE
Holding would render the second portion of section 1400(b) su-
perfluous, thereby violating the "cardinal rule" of statutory con-
struction that each part of an act should have meaning. 1 6
C. The CAFC Opinion
The CAFC agreed to hear VE Holding's appeal in order to
resolve the conflict among district courts over the proper inter-
109. Id. slip op. at 4.
110. Id. slip op. at 5.
111. Id.
112. Id. slip op. at 5.
113. Id. slip op. at 6. The court considered the evidence of legislative history
presented by VE Holding to be inconclusive and "too tenuous... to find conclusively
that Congress intended to change the scope of section 1400(b)." Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. slip op. at 5-6.
116. Id. slip op. at 7.
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pretation of the relationship between sections 1391(c) and
1400(b)." The CAFC reversed and remanded, holding that
Congress intended the definition of "reside" in section 1391(c) to
apply to all venue provisions within the chapter, including sec-
tion 1400(b). " '
Judge Plager, writing for a unanimous court,119 limited
Fourco and its progeny by categorizing them as isolated inter-
pretations of then-current statutory language rather than as
general interpretations of the history and purpose of section
1400(b).120 He narrowed the analysis to an inquiry of Congress'
intent in adopting the amendments to section 1391(c).121
Judge Plager began his analysis by reviewing the plain lan-
guage of the statute, noting that where the language is clear and
unambiguous, the plain meaning will be treated as dispositive. 2
Judge Plager concluded that the language of section 1391(c) was
both clear and unambiguous, and that "[s]ection 1391(c) applies
to all of chapter 87 of title 28, and thus to section 1400(b), as
expressed by the words 'For purposes of venue under this chap-
ter.' There can be no mistake about that. 1 23
117. VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1575, 16
U.S.P.Q.2d 1614, 1615 (Fed. Cir. 1990). On March 22, 1990, the CAFC also granted a
petition for appeal in Century Wrecker, 902 F.2d 43 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
118. VE Holding, 917 F.2d at 1575-76, 1578-79, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1614, 1616-17.
119. Judges Archer and Clevenger concurred in the opinion.
.120. Judge Plager made short shrift of fifty years of judicial precedent, including
four major Supreme Court decisions, in the following few sentences:
The specific question in Fourco was whether the statutory language previously
enacted by the Congress as § 1391(c) supported a conclusion that Congress in-
tended to have §§ 1391(c) and 1400(b) read together. On the basis of the nonspe-
cific language of § 1391(c) and prior history as the Court read it, the Court con-
cluded the answer was no.
Section 1391(c) as it was in Fourco is no longer. We now have exact and clas-
sic language of incorporation: "For purposes of venue under this chapter. .. ."
Congress could readily have added "except for section 1400(b)," if that exception,
which we can presume was well known to the Congress, was intended to be main-
tained....
The issue, then, is not whether the prior cases, including Supreme Court cases,
determined that under different statutory language Congress' intent was that §
1400(b) stood alone. The issue is, what, as a matter of first impression, should we
conclude the Congress now intends by this new language in the venue act.
Id. at 1579, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1616-18 (emphasis in original).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1578-79, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1616-17.
123. Id. at 1580, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1616-17.
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Judge Plager did not apply the rule of statutory interpreta-
tion that states that general statutes do not control or nullify
specific statutes, absent a clear legislative expression to the con-
trary. 24 He gave two reasons to allow the general provision of
section 1391(c) to control those of section 1400(b). First, the lan-
guage of section 1391(c) "expressly reads itself into" section
1400(b). 28 Second, the provisions of section 1391(c) only define
a single term contained in section 1400(b) and do not govern
patent venue or provide a separate rule for its operation. 2 ' Even
if the statutory rule were applicable, the court stated that the
language of section 1391(c) provided "'a clear intention' that
§1391(c) is to supplement § 1400(b). '1 27
Judge Plager buttressed the court's holding by determining
that the legislative history of the Act revealed that Congress did
not intend to contradict the plain meaning of the statute. 2
Finding no specific legislative history, Judge Plager decided that
he was justified in relying on the plain language of the statute. 2 9
He invoked the rule that Congress' knowledge of established ju-
dicial precedent may be presumed by a court interpreting legis-
lation.13 0 In support of this presumption, Judge Plager indicated
that the amendments were the result of much compromise and
debate in Congress.' 3 ' He further found that the compromises
124. Id., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1618.
125. Id.
126. Id. Judge Plager countered the position taken by the district court that the
CAFC's decision would render the second test under section 1400(b) superfluous and
therefore meaningless, by stating that this position "overlooks that § 1400(b) applies to
all defendants, not just corporate defendants, and thus the second test for venue remains
operative with respect to defendants that are not corporations." Id. at 1580 n.17, 16
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1618 n. 17 (emphasis in original).
127. Id. at 1580, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1618.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1580-81, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1618-19. The court quoted the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95 (1985) which stated: "defer-
ence to the supremacy of the Legislature, as well as recognition that Congressmen typi-
cally vote on the language of a bill, generally requires [courts] to assume that 'the legisla-
tive purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.'" (quoting
Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962)). VE Holding, 917 F.2d at 1581, 16
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1619.
130. Id. (citing Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 184-85 (1988)).
131. Id. at 1581-82, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1619. The court cited the following statements
made by Senator Heflin, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative
Practice, regarding a group of proposed provisions which included the amendments to
[Vol. 11:667
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and debate are significant in that "strict adherence to the lan-
guage and structure of an Act is particularly appropriate where
... a statute is the result of a series of carefully crafted
compromises."s3
Judge Plager further stated that the court's interpretation
of the effects of section 1391(c) on section 1400(b) was so pre-
dictable that Congress must have intended that result.13 3 As evi-
dence of the probability that Congress intended the result
adopted by the court, he referred to: academic criticisms of sec-
tion 1400(b);134 a 1974 resolution adopted by the Patent, Trade-
mark and Copyright Section of the American Bar Association
advocating that the term "resides" in section 1400(b) be defined
by section 1391(c); 135 the disparity between venue requirements
section 1391(c):
Title X consists of 23 miscellaneous provisions to improve the administration of
justice. Most come from specific recommendations of the Judicial Conference as
developed over the past several years as problems surface. The source and merits
of the various provisions are discussed in the section-by-section analysis. This bill
represents numerous hours of negotiation and compromise.
Id. at 1581, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1619 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
The court also cited the decision in Century Wrecker Corp. v. Vulcan Equip. Co.,
733 F. Supp. 1170, 1173, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1715, 1717 (E.D. Tenn. 1989) which noted that
the phrase "for purposes of venue under this chapter" was included in the proposed
redraft of section 139 1(c) as early as December, 1985, and that the phrase had not been
amended or modified in two years of consideration of the amendments to section 1391(c).
VE Holding, 917 F.2d at 1582, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1619-20.
Finally, the court quoted a memorandum from Professor Edward H. Cooper, the
reporter for the Judicial Conference Subcommittee, to the Subcommittee explaining the
proposed modifications to section 1391(c):
The [new] definition of corporate residence in § 1391(c) now provides a basis for
applying the substantial number of venue statutes enacted as part of the various
substantive federal laws. As a matter of caution, the proposal limits its definition
of residence to the venue provisions gathered in Chapter 87 of the Judicial Code,
28 U.S.C. §§ 1391 through 1412.
Id. at 1582, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1620 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
132. Id. (quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 748
n.14, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1985, 1993 n.14 (1989)).
133. Id. at 1583, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1620-21.
134. Id. at 1582-83, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1620-21. Judge Plager cited the discussion of
Congress' original intent in adopting section 1400(b) contained in Wydick, Venue in Ac-
tions for Patent Infringement, 25 STN. L. REv. 551 (1973) and Waldrop, The Patent
Venue Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) Should Not Be Repealed, 4 A.P.L.A. Q. J. 32 (1976).
135. VE Holding, 917 F.2d at 1583, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1621. The court quoted the
Section's opinion that the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 1400(b) in Fourco
was the result of "historical accident". Id.
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for declaratory judgments and patent infringement actions; s6
and a statement by Justice White. 13 7
IV. Criticism of the Patent Venue Statute
Judge Plager concluded the CAFC's opinion in VE Holding
with the observation that a more suitable resolution to the issue
would be congressional repeal of section 1400(b). Venue in pat-
ent infringement actions would then be governed entirely by the
general venue statute. 3 8 The court's dicta reflects years of con-
troversy over, and criticism of, section 1400(b).
Since 1965, the Patent, Trademark and Copyright Section
of the American Bar Association (Patent Section) has proposed
six separate resolutions addressing section 1400(b).3 a The latest
136. Id. at 1583, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1620. The court indicated that its decision would
bring "the law of venue in patent cases more in line with venue law generally, as well as
with other types of patent litigation." Id. at 1583-84, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1621.
137. Id. (The court incorrectly attributed the quote to Justice White. Justice Mar-
shall was the author of the Court's opinion in Brunette Machine Works, Ltd. v. Kockum
Indus., 406 U.S. 706, 174 U.S.P.Q. 1 (1972)). The court quoted the following statement:
Ironically, changes in the general venue law have left the patent venue statute far
behind. Since 1948, the general venue law has authorized suit against a corporate
defendant not only where he maintains a "regular and established place of busi-
ness" as in § 1400(b), but also where he is "doing business." 62 Stat. 935, now §
1391(c). And since 1966, the general venue law has authorized suit where "the
claim arose .... "
Id. (quoting Brunette Machine Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., 406 U.S. 706, 713 n.13,
174 U.S.P.Q. 1, 3-4 n.13 (1972).
138. Id. at 1583, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1620-21.
139. The Patent Section proposed five resolutions regarding section 1400(b) prior to
the 1989 resolution. The current resolution represents a gradual change in position of the
Patent Section toward section 1400(b).
The resolution proposed in 1965 opposed the adoption of proposed legislation to
repeal Section 1400(b). Clark, Proposal to Repeal Special Venue Section Relating to
Patent Infringement Actions, 1965 A.BA. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT L. 148.
The Patent Section relied on the Supreme Court's decisions in Stonite, Fourco, and
Schnell, and on congressional history that indicated that "the forum of a patent in-
fringement action should be one reasonably convenient to the defendant." Id. at 149.
The committee further noted that Section 1400(b) represented legislative policy which
recognized the "technical and intricate nature of patent litigation" and that "practicality
and convenience" were best served by the provision of Section 1400(b). Id.
In 1966, the Patent Section recommended expanding the scope of "resides" to in-
clude "any state in which it is incorporated or of any judicial district in which it has a
principal place of business." Wyss, Proposal to Amend Special Venue Statute Relating
to Patent Infringement Actions, 1966 A.BA. SEc. PAT. TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT L.
122. The committee stated the proposed modification to Section 1400(b) would "decrease
the possibility of future attempts" to repeal section 1400(b). Id. at 123.
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resolution, proposed in 1989, favored the legislative repeal of
section 1400(b)."10
The Patent Section provided several reasons in support of
its resolution which illustrate the most frequently advanced crit-
icisms of section 1400(b). First, the Patent Section criticized the
Supreme Court's interpretation in Stonite and Fourco of section
1400(b) as the exclusive venue provision for patent infringe-
ment,'41 and it criticized the Court for restricting "resides" to
the defendant's state of incorporation. 1 2 The Patent Section re-
In 1974, the Patent Section proposed an amendment to section 1400(b) providing
that the definition of "residence of a corporation" in section 1391(c) be used as the defi-
nition of "resides" under section 1400(b). Gess, Desirability of Initiating Patent Litiga-
tion Wherever the Defendant is Found, 1974 A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK AND COPY-
RIGHT L. 114.
The Patent Section cited several reasons for its recommendation. First, they be-
lieved the interpretation adopted by the Supreme Court in Fourco, was the result of
"historical accident" which "create[d] confusion in the courts and ... unduly shield[ed]
a corporate infringer." Id. at 115. Second, under an action for declaratory judgment, "the
plaintiff/alleged infringer [has a] wider latitude in his choice of forum than the patentee"
because venue for declaratory judgment actions is governed by § 1391(c). Id. Third,
other special venue statutes had been held to be supplemented by section 1391(c). Id.
Finally, the Patent Section found that the Act of 1897, which created the predecessor to
§ 1400(b), was "intended to eliminate the abuses that resulted from the absence of [28
U.S.C.] Section 1404(a)" which provides for the transfer of venue to another forum at
the court's discretion. Id. At the time of the Act of 1897, there was no provision for
venue transfer and an alleged infringer could be sued in any forum in which he could be
found. Id. The Patent Section felt that its current recommendation would put the choice
of venue back within the discretion of the courts through the operation of the transfer of
venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)(1988). Id. at 115-16.
In 1975, Subcommittee A of the Committee on Enforcement of Patents proposed a
legislative amendment to implement the 1974 resolution. Schneider, Extending the Pat-
ent Venue Statute with Respect to Corporations, 1975 A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK AND
COPYRIGHT L. 84. The Subcommittee recommended expanding the scope of "resides" to
include the judicial district in which the corporate defendant is licensed to do business
or is doing business. Id. at 85. The Subcommittee felt a deletion of section 1400(b) with-
out additional changes might create more confusion and ambiguities when the courts
determined venue under the existing general venue provisions. Id.
Subcommittee B of the Committee on Federal Practice and Procedure also proposed
a revision to section 1400(b) in 1975. Bosses, Revision of the Patent Venue Statute, 1975
A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT L. 185. The Subcommittee recommended
the deletion of the "act of infringement" provision from section 1400(b), leaving only the
"resides" and "regular and established place of business" requirements. Id.
140. Peterson, Repeal of the Patent Venue Statute, 1989 A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADE-
MARK AND COPYRIGHT L. 240. The A.B.A. delegates adopted a similar resolution in Febru-
ary 1991.
141. Peterson, supra note 140, at 243.
142. Id.
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lied extensively on the criticisms propounded by James Ger-
iak 1 8 and Professors Wydick,"' Wright, " and Moore,14 in sup-
port of its position.14 7
Professor Wydick advocated a repeal of section 1400(b),
stating that its "original purpose has been frustrated by judicial
opinions, and its continued existence serves merely to consume
the time and effort of lawyers and judges and to strain the
purses and patience of persons seeking prompt, efficient adjudi-
cation of their rights."1 48 Professor Wydick contended that in
Stonite49 the Supreme Court misinterpreted Congress' legisla-
tive intent. He concluded that the purpose of the patent venue
statute was to expand the venue options of plaintiffs in patent
infringement actions and that it was not a narrower, more re-
strictive provision, as the Supreme Court had determined.150
Professor Wydick further contended that the Fourco decision re-
sulted from an uncritical analysis of the earlier Stonite
decision.11
The Patent Section also criticized the Supreme Court's re-
strictive interpretation of section 1400(b) in Fourco and Stonite
because it prevented patent venue from expanding along with
the expansion of venue under section 1391(c). 152 The Patent Sec-
tion commented that "the general venue provisions have
changed to reflect modern day business practices, [but] the pat-
ent venue provisions have not, and remain essentially locked to
the business environment of 1897." '' s
143. See Geriak, Fifteen Years of Fourco - The Needless Disputes Over Patent
Venue, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 55 (1972).
144. See Wydick, supra note 23.
145. See WRIGHT, supra note 14, at § 3823.
146. See 1A J. MooRE, W. TAGGART, AL VESTAL, J. WICKER & B. RINGLE, MOORE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.344 at 4240-60 (2d ed. 1990).
147. See Peterson, supra note 140, at 243-44.
148. See Wydick, supra note 23, at 551.
149. Id. at 557-58.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 559. See also Geriak, supra note 143, at 56-60; MOORE, supra note 146, 1
0.44[9], at 4244-51; WRIGHT, supra note 14, § 3823, at 135-39.
152. See Peterson, supra note 140, at 243.
153. Id. at 245. For emphasis, the Patent Section referred to Justice Marshall's com-
ment in Brunette, see supra note 137, and to the expanded scope of section 1391(c)
created by the Judicial Improvements Act, see supra note 2. Id. Ironically, the Section
mentioned that the expanded venue offered under section 1391(c) will most likely have
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The second advantage of repeal would be to clarify the am-
biguous and conflicting case law interpreting the phrases "regu-
lar and established place of business" and "acts of infringe-
ment," thereby making venue interpretations easier and
reducing the cost and time of litigating venue decisions.15' The
conflicting judicial interpretations of the terms "acts of infringe-
ment" and "regular and established place of business" in section
1400(b) have created an unworkable body of law and result in
much unnecessary and expensive litigation. 6" Even with a judi-
cial resolution by the CAFC of the conflicting case law, repeal of
section 1400(b) would still be needed to alleviate the restrictive
interpretation of section 1400(b) created by Fourco and
Stonite.15e
Finally, repeal would eliminate the disparity between venue
provisions for patent infringement actions and those for declara-
tory judgment actions.1 57 The current interpretation of section
1400(b) creates a disparity between patent infringement actions
and declaratory judgment actions, which are governed by section
1391(c)."'8 Most of the evidence presented under both actions is
identical; however, the determination of venue depends on
which party files first - the alleged patent infringer (for a de-
claratory judgment) or the patentee (for infringement).
Professor Wydick discounted the benefit of conducting trial
at the defendant's corporate headquarters because of the availa-
bility of witnesses and documents, principally because other
"complex" litigation with similar evidentiary requirements is
governed by the general venue statutes.159 The Patent Section
stated unequivocally that there is no justification for maintain-
no effect on the current interpretation of section 1400(b). Id. at 243-44.
154. Id. See also Wydick, supra note 23, at 573-81.
155. See Peterson, supra note 140, at 246.
156. Id. at 243.
157. Id. at 243; see also Geriak, supra note 143, at 61.
158. See Peterson, supra note 140, at 243.
159. Id. at 247 (citing cases in-which provisions of the general venue statutes were
found to supplement other special venue statutes: Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202
(1966) (Jones Act); Vermont Castings, Inc. v. Evans Prods., 510 F. Supp. 940 (D. Vt.
1981) (antitrust venue provision)). The discussion further noted that current judicial in-
terpretations have allowed venue far from a corporate defendant's headquarters. Id. (cit-
ing London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1148 (N.D. IMI. 1987) (venue estab-
lished in Northern District of Illinois under "regular and established place of business"
test by activities of three employee/salespersons residing in forum)).
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ing a special venue statute for patent law.' 60 The arguments ad-
vanced to justify its existence, particularly the argument that
patent litigation involves technical and complex material requir-
ing a forum convenient to the defendant, are undermined by the
fact that other technical areas of law do not require special
venue provisions.161 Furthermore, a transfer of venue under Sec-
tion 1404(a) is available to a defendant if an action is in an im-
proper venue.' 62
V. Analysis
A. The CAFC's decision in VE Holding
The CAFC began its analysis with the language of the stat-
ute, but failed to consider Supreme Court precedent in the area
of patent venue. 163 The CAFC dismissed the Court's decision in
Fourcol" as an isolated interpretation of the statutory language
in effect at that time.""5 Instead, the CAFC addressed the issue
as one of "first impression"16 6 - an approach the Supreme
Court did not find objectionable.16 7
If the concept of stare decisis is to be preserved, then the
district court's approach in VE Holding is the correct one in
light of the Court's previous decisions. Although the district
court acknowledged that VE Holding's arguments were compel-
ling, it found that the Supreme Court had clearly established
section 1400(b) as the sole and exclusive patent venue statute. It
therefore appropriately held that the Supreme Court's rules
160. See Peterson, supra note 140, at 247.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. The court ignored the Supreme Court's decisions in Stonite, Schnell and
Brunette.
164. 353 U.S. 222, 113 U.S.P.Q 234 (1957).
165. VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1579, 16
U.S.P.Q.2d 1614, 1617-18 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
166. Id. at 1575, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1614.
167. The Supreme Court's denial of the writ of certiorari is in keeping with its re-
cent liberal approach to stare decisis. See Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76
GEo. L.J. 1361 (1988); Greenhouse, A Longtime Precedent for Disregarding Precedent,
N.Y. TMEs, July 21, 1991, at E4. A major reason behind Congress' creation of the CAFC,
however, was to remedy the lack of Supreme Court review of cases in patent law. See S.
REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 11, 14-15. Clearly, the few opinions that exist should be accorded great weight.
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must be followed unless the Court or Congress expressly over-
turns the Court's decisions.168
The CAFC also misapplied its stated rules of statutory in-
terpretation. It attempted to distinguish the well established
principle of statutory interpretation that a specific statute is not
controlled or nullified by a general statute.16 In Radzanower v.
Touche Ross & Co.,170 the Supreme Court stated the rule as: "a
statute dealing with a narrow, precise, and specific subject is not
submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more genera-
lized spectrum. 17 1 The opinions cited by the Court in Radza-
nower as authority for this principle considered the manner in
which the provisions of the general statute affected those of the
specific statute. The only consideration given was whether the
legislature had manifested a "clear intention" to have the gen-
eral statute affect the specific statute.1 72 The Court provided
several rules for determining whether a "clear intention" is pre-
sent. The Court stated that "[i]t is, of course, a cardinal princi-
ple of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not
favored.173 A general statute may repeal a specific one by impli-
cation only if the two are in "irreconcilable conflict" or "if the
later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly
intended as a substitute .. .. 17 According to the rules outlined
in Radzanower, the CAFC should have found that there was in-
sufficient legislative history to conclude that Congress intended
to modify section 1400(b).
The CAFC attempted to circumvent the lack of legislative
history by presuming that Congress must have been aware of the
effect the section 1391(c) amendments would have on section
168. VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co, No. C89-3856SCENE, slip op.
at 3-4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 1990).
169. VE Holding, 917 F.2d at 1580.
170. 426 U.S. 148 (1976).
171. Id. at 153. The Court cites as further authority Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820
(1976); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51 (1974); Bulova Watch Co. v. United
States, 365 U.S. 753, 758 (1961); Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prod. Corp., 353 U.S.
222, 113 U.S.P.Q. 234 (1957); Stonite Prod. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 52
U.S.P.Q. 507 (1942); Rodger v. United States, 185 U.S. 83, 87-89 (1902); Ex Parte Crow
Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 570-71 (1883).
172. Id. at 154.
173. Id. (quoting United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 168
(1976)).
174. Id. (quoting Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936)).
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1400(b). 17' The CAFC supported its presumption by quoting
Senator Heflin's statement that the amendments were the result
of numerous compromises and debates.1 76 In doing so the CAFC
misapplied the rule of statutory construction employed by the
Supreme Court in Community for Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid,177 that strict adherence to the statutory language is appro-
priate when the language results from a series of carefully con-
sidered compromises. '7  The statement by Senator Heflin17 9
clearly applies to the entire Judicial Improvements and Access
to Justice Act and not to the specific amendment of section
1391(c).
Finally, the CAFC's opinion failed to address the impact its
decision would have on the remainder of section 1400(b). As the
district court noted, a holding similar to the CAFC's would
render the second prong of section 1400(b) meaningless. 80 In
VE Holding, the CAFC addressed this issue by noting that sec-
tion 1400(b) would still apply to noncorporate defendants.' 8s
This argument, although outwardly plausible, is erroneous be-
cause a review of patent infringement cases produces few, if any,
non-corporate defendant. 82
The CAFC's holding goes beyond rendering the second
prong of section 1400(b) useless: it eliminates the entire concept
of patent venue for corporate defendants because the court has
equated personal jurisdiction with venue. 83 Although Congress
175. VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1581, 16
U.S.P.Q.2d 1614, 1619 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
176. Id. See supra note 131 for the text of Senator Heflin's statement.
177. 490 U.S. 730, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1985 (1989).
178. Id. at 738 n.14, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1993 n.14. See supra note 131.
179. See supra note 131.
180. VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co, No. C89-3856SCENE, slip op.
at 7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 1990).
181. See supra note 126.
182. It has been noted that fewer patents are granted each year to individuals and
that recently Japanese corporations have been granted more patents than American cor-
porations. See Schlesinger, An Open Letter to President George Bush, 73 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK 01T. Soc'Y 484, 485 (1991).
183. It can be argued that the current version of 1391(c) is unconstitutional because
of its complete elimination of venue for corporate defendants. See Cox, Jurisdiction,
Venue, and Aggregation of Contacts: The Real Minimum Contacts and Federalism
Questions Raised by Omni Capital, International v. Rudolph Wolff & Co., 42 ARK. L.
REV. 211 (1989) (contending that a separate constitutional right exists for venue separate
and distinct from personal jurisdiction).
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may have intended such a dramatic occurrence for the general
venue statute, it cannot be assumed that such a result was in-
tended for the patent venue statute without more substantive
indications.1 8 4
B. The Need for a Unique Patent Venue Statute
Critics of the statute have correctly observed that a judicial
interpretation of the statute would not clarify the convoluted
and ambiguous case law interpreting the phrases "regular and
established place of business" and "act of infringement." More-
over, such a decision would not remove the disparity between
the venue provisions for patent infringement actions and other
patent related actions. 8 5 Almost unanimously, these critics have
advocated repeal of section 1400(b).' Their reflexive response
to the problems associated with section 1400(b) ignores the
unique nature of patent law and the need for a special venue
provision to protect corporate defendants. Legislative action is
necessary to clarify the law and to remedy the defect in the stat-
utory language of section 1400(b).
Ample precedent exists for maintaining special venue provi-
sions for particular areas of the law. 8 7 Patent infringement ac-
tions should be treated separately for several reasons. First, the
United States Constitution recognizes the importance of the pat-
ent system.' Second, several courts have adopted a line of rea-
soning to support the existence of a special venue provision
184. See Note, supra note 23 (concluding after an examination of the legislative
history of the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act that Congress did not
intend for the implicit repeal of section 1400(b)).
185. See Peterson, supra note 140, at 247.
186. See, e.g., Wydick, supra note 23, at 584-85; Peterson, supra note 140, at 240-47;
WRIGHT, supra note 14, § 3823 ("The statute ought to be repealed and patent cases
treated in the same fashion as federal question cases generally.").
187. Special venue statutes already exist for suits against aliens, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d)
(1988); suits involving national banking associations, 28 U.S.C. § 1394 (1988); suits for
collection of internal revenue taxes, 28 U.S.C. § 1396 (1988); suits regarding Interstate
Commerce Commission orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1398 (1988); and suits for shareholders' deriv-
ative actions, 28 U.S.C. § 1401 (1988).
188. Congress' power to issue patents is found in the Constitution: "The Congress
shall have Power To... promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
1991]
27
PACE LAW REVIEW
predicated on the unique nature of patent litigation.8 9 Third,
Congress has clearly recognized the unique character of patent
law by creating the CAFC as a special court to address all ap-
peals on matters of patent law. Congress' intent in creating the
CAFC was to improve the efficiency of the federal courts in
hearing patent litigation, to provide uniformity and stability in
the treatment of patent law among the circuits, and to discour-
age forum shopping. 190 Senator Patrick Leahy stated in a letter
to the Senate Subcommittee on Courts considering the creation
of the CAFC:
I believe that patent law stands apart from virtually every other
legal discipline both in its extreme focus on science and technol-
ogy and its need for uniformity in decisionmaking ....
In patent cases, the court is almost always dealing with
claims of innovation and weighing one body of technical evidence
against another.
In short, I am aware of no likely candidate [other than patent
law] for an additional specialty court and wish to place in the
record the considerations I believe justify distinguishing patent
cases from other litigation.191
In fact, the repeal of section 1400(b) would contravene one
of Congress' reasons for creating the CAFC - the elimination
of forum shopping in patent infringement actions. The American
189. The court in Ruth v. Eagle-Picher Co., 225 F.2d 572, 106 U.S.P.Q. 251 (10th
Cir. 1955), adopted the policy that:
A patent infringement action involves a peculiar combination of science or tech-
nology and law. In the ascertainment of the pertinent technical facts, it is impor-
tant that the trial judge have first-hand visual and audible knowledge of the con-
ditions, the environment and the art itself and the testimony of the most
competent witnesses. Practicality and convenience are best served when the case
is prosecuted where the alleged acts of infringement occurred and the defendant
has a regular and established place of business.
An intention on the part of Congress to depart from that policy should not be
lightly inferred.
Id. at 577, 106 U.S.P.Q. at 255. See also Jeffrey Galion, Inc. v. Joy Mfg. Co., 323 F. Supp.
261, 168 U.S.P.Q. 708 (N.D. W. Va. 1971); Vibber v. United States Rubber Co., 255 F.
Supp. 47, 150 U.S.P.Q. 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Morse v. Master Specialties Co., 239 F. Supp.
641, 144 U.S.P.Q. 528 (D.N.J. 1964); Bradford Novelty Co. v. Manheim, 156 F. Supp.
489, 115 U.S.P.Q. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
190. S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 11, 14-15.
191. Id. at 39.
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Law Institute, in recommending repeal of section 1400(b), ac-
knowledged that expanding venue provisions would increase the
already prevalent forum shopping in patent litigation.
192
Finally, the CAFC has created a body of patent law
favorable to patentees that necessitates a special, restrictive
venue provision to protect corporate defendants. 19 CAFC opin-
ions favor patentees in the areas of the statutory presumption of
validity,14  secondary considerations," 5  and patent infringe-
ment."'6 The CAFC routinely vacates holdings of invalidity if
the infringement action fails. 9 7 Additionally, the CAFC has also
192. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 220-21 (1969).
193. The CourtIt recognized with section 1391(c) that current developments in the
law and the applicable venue provision are related. See Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 384 U.S.
202, 204 (1966) (Congress enacted section 1391(c) "to bring venue law in tune with mod-
em concepts of corporate operations.").
194. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1988). See also Adelman, The New World of Patents
Created by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 979, 992
(1987); American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 220 U.S.P.Q.
763 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821, 224 U.S.P.Q. 520 (1984) (firmly adopting the
clear and convincing standard required to overcome the statutory presumption of a pat-
ent's validity); SSIH Equip. S.A. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365, 219
U.S.P.Q. 686 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (each claim of a patent must be challenged independently,
unlike previous courts which allowed the validity of a patent to be attacked as a whole);
Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 218 U.S.P.Q. 871 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (dis-
allowed any shifting of the burden of proof to the plaintiff or any weakening of it by the
introduction of evidence not considered by the Patent and Trademark Office).
195. Harris, The Emerging Primacy of "Secondary Considerations" as Validity
Ammunition: Has the Federal Circuit gone too far?, 71 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y
185, 201 (1989) ("The one-sidedness of the CAFC approach, in approving only pro-pat-
entee forms of secondary considerations evidence . . . is a pattern which would not be
surprising in a brief by a patentee's counsel.").
196. Hantman, Patent Infringement 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 454 (1990):
The CAFC decisions have clearly shifted the advantage to the patentee in defense
of his property rights.... As has been shown in its departures on literal infringe-
ment and the doctrine of equivalents, the CAFC has abandoned judicial precedent
and tended to create new law in support of the patentee's positions. But whatever
the reason for the CAFC's bias toward the patentee, it is wishful thinking to be-
lieve that the actions of the CAFC will result in the encouragement of innovation.
Id. at 518.
197. See Re and Rooklidge, Vacating Patent Invalidity Judgments Upon an Ap-
pellate Determination of Noninfringement, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 780
(1990). The authors contend that the CAFC's practice of routinely vacating declarations
of invalidity adds to the expense of litigation. Particularly, patentees may assert a resur-
rected patent against other infringers or against the same infringer in another forum. (As
examples, the authors cite Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Cardinal Chem. Co., No. 6:83-889-OK
(D.S.C.), and Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Atochem North America, Inc., No. 87-60-CMW (D.
29
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expanded injunctive relief'98 and upheld excessive damage
awards against infringers. 199
The precedent established by the CAFC has dramatically
increased the importance of winning in the district court.200 A
statistical study indicates that the CAFC affirmed district court
decisions three times as often as it reversed them.2 10 The prob-
lem becomes more acute with jury trials, which have markedly
increased since the creation of the CAFC.20 2 Juries tend to be
pro-patentee0 3 and the standard for reversal of a jury verdict is
higher than that of a bench verdict.20 There is not much hope
Del.), in which the patentee asserted a patent resurrected by the CAFC in Morton Thio-
kol, Inc. v. Argus Chem. Corp., 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1152 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Id. at 795, 795 n. 75.
See also, Donafrio, The Disposition of Unreviewable Judgments by the Federal Circuit,
73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 462 (1991).
198. See Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 219 U.S.P.Q. 686 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 996, 220 U.S.P.Q. 385 (1983).
199. See Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 789 F.2d 1556, 229 U.S.P.Q. 561
(Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 850 (1986) (upholding record 909 million dollars in
damages against Kodak); see also Ropski and Cooperman, Damages in USA Intellectual
Property Litigation, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 181 (1990).
200. Schwab, Defending a Patent Case Under the Watchful Eye of the Federal
Circuit, 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 100, 104 (1988) ("To be successful on any
other defense, however, it is almost essential to prevail in the district court, because the
overwhelming majority of all Federal Circuit decisions which favored the alleged in-
fringer are affirmances of the district court.").
201. Coolley, What the Federal Circuit Has Done and How Often: Statistica S
of the CAFC Patent Decisions - 1982 to 1988, 71 J. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y
385, 388 (1989). The statistics become more significant when the issues litigated are ana-
lyzed. In cases in which patent invalidity was at issue, the CAFC affirmed the lower
tribunals almost universally when the tribunal found the patent valid. However, when
patents were held invalid, the percentages were nearly fifty-fifty. Id. at 391.
202. See Hofer, The Real World of Juries, Damages, and Injunctions in Patent
Cases, 50 ALB. L. REv. 593 (1986).
203. Id. at 594. The author conducted a study of every district court decision during
the period 1975-1979. He found that approximately two-thirds of patents tried before a
jury were held valid. Id.
204. Most patent cases have been tried to the bench, and therefore the "clearly erro-
neous" standard of Rule 52 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has applied to
review of the trial court's decision. See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 774 F.2d
1082, 227 U.S.P.Q. 337 (Fed. Cir. 1985), rev'd, 475 U.S. 809, 229 U.S.P.Q. 478 (1986).
Jury trials present a greater obstacle for review because appellate review involves sev-
enth amendment issues with the implied, if not express, higher level of review needed to
overturn the jury's verdict. See Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645 (1946) (reversible error
occurs when there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the jury's verdict).
For the CAFC's treatment of jury verdicts, see Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d
1542, 220 U.S.P.Q. 193 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford
Co., 758 F.2d 613, 225 U.S.P.Q. 634 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel
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for a defendant to receive any review of the CAFC's decision, as
the probability of obtaining a writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court is slight.2 0
5
Finally, the perceived bias of the CAFC can induce paten-
tees holding marginal patents to enforce their patents through
litigation or the threat of litigation.20 6 The Court recognized the
coercive effect of threatened litigation by a patentee in Blonder-
Tongue Lab. v. Univ. of Ill. Found..27 The Court relied exten-
sively on the high costs faced by defendants in patent litigation
as the basis for establishing that a previous holding of patent
invalidity acted as res judicata on future litigation involving that
patent.208 Justice White, writing for the Court, stated:
[T]he defendant in an infringement suit will have even higher
costs [than the plaintiff] as he both introduces proof to overcome
the presumption [of validity] and attempts to rebut whatever
Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also Hofer, The
CAFC and Fact/Law Questions in Patent Cases: The Jury's Role Burgeons!, 12
A.P.L.A.Q.J. 295 (1984). Writing of the CAFC's approach to jury damage awards, Hofer
stated:
[Tlhe CAFC is willing to go far to affirm jury damage awards.... It [the CAFC's
approach] encourages jury trials. It greatly expands the jury's role. Now validity
and infringement will be decided by 6 to 12 lay persons, rather than a few lawyer/
judges. It is not a bad game - because it's played in the patentee's ballpark.
Id. at 309.
205. See Banner, The Creation of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals and the
Resulting Revitalization of the Patent System, 50 ALs. L. REv. 585, 585 (1986) ("While,
theoretically, the possibility of having a patent infringement case further considered by
the Supreme Court exists, many efforts to have the Court review a decision by the Fed-
eral Circuit have been fruitless."). To date, the Court has heard only two appeals from
the CAFC. See Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp. 475 U.S. 809, 229 U.S.P.Q. 478
(1986); Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2683, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1760 (1990).
See also, Vandenburg, The Truth About Patent Litigation for Patent Owners Contem-
plating Suit, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 301, 307 (1991).
206. Sobel, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: A Fifth Anniversary
Look at Its Impact on Patent Law and Litigation, 37 AM. U.L. REv. 1087, 1090 (1988).
An example of this possibility is the aggressive enforcement by Texas Instruments, Inc.
of its assorted patents on integrated circuits and computer memory chips. Texas Instru-
ments has been demanding large royalty fees for licensing rights to its patents and has
been willing to sue for infringement when other companies have not agreed to the fees.
Several smaller corporations have criticized Texas Instruments for its practices, stating
that they will ultimately stifle innovation in the industry. See N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 16, 1990,
at Dl, col. 3; CHICAGO ThmuNER, Oct. 14, 1990, at I1B; WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 21, 1990,
at Hl, col. 1.
207. 402 U.S. 313, 169 U.S.P.Q. 513 (1971).
208. Id. at 335, 169 U.S.P.Q. at 533.
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proof the patentee offers to bolster the claims. In testimony
before the Senate subcommittee considering patent law revision
in 1967, a member of the President's Commission on the Patent
System discussed the financial burden looming before one
charged as a defendant in a complex infringement action in terms
of amounts that sometimes run to "hundreds of thousands of
dollars."' 09
Critics of section 1400(b) have been quick to complain of
the statute's failure to adapt to changes in the law.2 0 Section
1391(c) governs a variety of actions, and therefore must be gen-
eral in its scope and adapt to changes in the laws to which it
pertains.2 1' It is unreasonable, however, to require the patent
venue statute to change in the identical fashion, as the two stat-
utes serve entirely different purposes. Unique venue statutes ex-
ist to serve the unique nature of the laws to which they apply. If
these statutes change with each modification of the general
venue provision, then why maintain separate provisions at all?
Any patent venue statute should reflect the particular needs of
defendants in patent litigation and the unique nature of patent
law.
C. Section 1400(b) as a True Venue Provision
Most venue provisions allow for venue in a jurisdiction in
which either the defendant resides or the claim arose.2 2 There
are two problems with the language of section 1400(b): the over-
lap of the two distinct tests for venue and the failure to define
for patent terms "where the claim arose." Section 1400(b) cur-
rently provides one test for residency (the "resides" question
which engendered VE Holding), and a second test requiring that
both the residence provision ("regular and established place of
business") and the claim arose provision ("act of infringement")
be satisfied. The combination of these tests has resulted in an
overly restrictive venue provision.1 Patentees should have the
209. Id. at 335-36 (citations omitted).
210. See Peterson, supra note 140, at 245; WRIGHT, supra note 14, § 3823, at 138;
Wydick, supra note 23, at 584.
211. See Note, Defining 'Doing Business' to Determine Corporate Venue, 65 TEx.
L. REV. 153 (1986).
212. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
213. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
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option to establish venue in either of the two locations (where
the defendant resides or where the claim arose). Additionally,
the tests should be structured to reflect the unique nature of
patent law. Therefore, the first step toward a new patent venue
statute should be the separation of the tests for venue: one for
the traditional notion of where the defendant resides and the
other for where the claim arose.
1. Where the Defendant Resides
The definition of "resides" employed prior to VE Holding
was a workable test which provided few interpretive problems
for the courts.21 Critics of the "resides" provision of section
1400(b) have not attacked the operation of the provision, but
only the Supreme Court's views that section 1400(b) is the sole
and exclusive venue provision for patent infringement actions.215
As a result, they contend that the "resides" test is more restric-
tive than the corresponding test in the general venue statute and
has allowed patent venue to evolve separately from the general
venue statute.2 16
Such critics as Professor Wydick have overemphasized the
importance of the original intent of Congress when it adopted
the patent venue statute. The intent of Congress almost 100
years ago is no longer germane to the discussion of the value of a
separate patent venue statute.217 A present need exists for an
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 20-21 (1969). The ALI proposed that section 1400(b) be re-
pealed and that the general venue provisions govern actions for patent infringement. Id.
In support of its position, the Study stated:
In United States Code Annotated there are more than 19 columns of annotations
of cases on what is a "regular and established place of business." Any venue stat-
ute that produces a large volume of litigation on where suit may be brought is
inherently suspect. Further, even giving the fullest weight to "the technical and
intricate nature of patent litigation," there is no compelling reason why the al-
leged infringer should not be suable in the district where he is claimed to have
acted wrongfully, even though he has no regular and established place of business
there.
Id. at 220-21 (citation omitted).
214. See supra notes 72-75.
215. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 140, at 244; WRIGHT, supra note 14, § 3823, at
138; Wydick, supra note 23, at 584.
216. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 140, at 245; WRIGHT, supra note 14, § 3823, at
138-39; Wydick, supra note 23, at 584.
217. Not all legal scholars are in agreement with Professors Wydick, Wright, and
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independent patent venue statute that will address existing con-
ditions in patent law.21
A modified version of section 1400(b) should continue to
provide that the "resides" test include the defendant's state of
incorporation. Patent venue, however, does need to change with
the realities of practice. A corporation is rarely restricted to do-
ing business in its state of incorporation. The "resides" provision
should be modestly expanded to include other forums in which
the defendant conducts a significant portion of its business.
Venue statutes should be easy for a court to interpret and im-
plement. 19 Therefore, any addition to the "resides" provision
should be clear and simple, but the overall scope of the venue
provision should be limited to restrict the possible forums.
2. Where the Claim Arose
The phrase "regular and established place of business"
should be deleted from the second portion of section 1400(b).
The courts have had great difficulty in interpreting the
phrase. 220 As a test of the defendant's residence, it overlaps the
"resides" test in the first prong of section 1400(b). An expansion
of "resides" would eliminate the need for this phrase. Addition-
ally, its conjunction with an "act of infringement" unduly re-
stricts the operation of the overall venue provision. Before VE
Holding, a plaintiff had to fufill a residence test and a claims
arose test to establish venue in a forum other than the defend-
ant's state of incorporation. Plaintiffs should be provided with
the opportunity to bring an action in the forum in which the
claim arose even if the defendant does not reside there.221
The provision of section 1400(b) pertaining to where the
cause of action arose - "act of infringement" - should be
clarified to reflect the specific elements of infringement.2 22
Courts have had difficulty interpreting the current language of
section 1400(b) because the language was not specific to in-
Moore. For a contrary interpretation of the legislative history of the 1897 Act, see Wal-
drop, supra note 23, at 38-40.
218. See supra notes 185-211 and accompanying text.
219. See MooRw, supra note 146, $ 0.340 at 4007.
220. See supra notes 76-87 and accompanying text.
221. See AMmcAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 213, at 221.
222. See supra note 71.
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fringement actions. Courts have attempted to treat these provi-
sions in a manner similar to certain tort actions. For example, a
corporate defendant in a product liability action may be amena-
ble to suit in the forum in which the injury occurs, even though
the product was manufactured in another jurisdiction.223 In
Union Asbestos & Rubber v. Evans Products,224 the court ex-
pressly refuted any parallel between the definition of "sale" in
infringement actions and "sale" in commercial law.225 Rather,
the court developed a test to establish an act of infringement
based on the defendant's "systematic and continuous solicita-
tion" of orders within the forum, 226 an analysis which is similar
to the "purposeful availment" rationale behind most long-arm
statutes used for obtaining personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. 2 7
Such an analogy is misplaced. The purpose of long-arm stat-
utes is to allow state courts to obtain jurisdiction over transient
defendants who commit isolated torts within the state, but
whose contacts with the forum are not sufficient to constitute a
presence there.228 Infringement of patented inventions, and par-
ticularly patented processes, have no one identifiable place
where the "injury" occurs. The damages from infringement do
not arise from isolated incidents, but are the cumulative result
of infringement in many forums. Irregularities in the law have
resulted from the courts' attempt to create this analogy.
The venue provision under the Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act 229 allows for venue "in any judicial district in which a
substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the
claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the sub-
ject of the action is situated .... ,,230 A similar provision should
be adopted for patent venue, placing emphasis on the origin of
the infringement - the place of manufacture or alternatively,
the primary point of distribution.
223. See Mooaz, supra note 146, T 4.41 at 352-53.
224. 328 F.2d 949, 140 U.S.P.Q. 634 (7th Cir. 1964).
225. Id. at 951-52, 140 U.S.P.Q. at 635-36.
226. Id. at 952, 140 U.S.P.Q. at 636.
227. See MooRE, supra note 146, 4.41 at 352.
228. See id. at 352-54.
229. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f) (1988).
230. Id. at §1391(f)(1).
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D. Suggested Amendment to Section 1400(b)
A modified version of section 1400(b) should include the
recommendations contained in Parts V-B and V-C above. The
following is the author's suggested language to replace the cur-
rent version of section 1400(b):
Any civil action for patent infringement or other actions related
to a United States patent may be brought in the judicial district
in which the defendant resides, or in which the defendant has
committed an act which constitutes the making, using, or saling
of the patented invention. For purposes of this section, a corpo-
rate defendant shall be deemed to reside in either its state of in-
corporation or the state in which it maintains a principal place of
business.
VI. Conclusion
The creation of the CAFC has been termed the "most im-
portant legislative act" in a decade during which the importance
and economic power of patents reached their highest level in the
200 year history of the patent system.23' The CAFC has brought
about uniformity and predictability in interpreting patent law
and has reinforced the economic power of patents. 2 2 In VE
Holding, the CAFC was presented with an opportunity to craft a
creative and unique remedy to the problems associated with sec-
tion 1400(b), reflecting the needs and realities of a revitalized
patent system. Instead, the court adhered to the old line of criti-
cisms and suggestions. Now, only congressional action can repair
the language of section 1400(b). A new venue provision should
be adopted. It should be patterned after the other federal venue
provisions, with language that reflects the realities of patent law.
It should define venue in terms tailored to patent law, and it
should protect corporate defendants from being forced to litigate
in burdensome and expensive forums. With the revitalization of
the patent system will come greater competition among technol-
ogy based businesses, greater emphasis by these businesses on
obtaining patents, and ultimately more patent litigation.213 Pro-
231. Kastriner, The Revival of Confidence in the Patent System, 73 J. PAT. &
TmDEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 5, 8 (1991).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 22-23.
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tection must be instituted to prevent aggressive patentees armed
with a powerful new patent system from smothering innovation
through the threat of expensive and debilitating litigation.
William C. Johnson
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